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NOTES
DISCOVERY IN FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS
Introduction
The extent to which discovery of documents should be allowed
in criminal proceedings has long been the subject of much contro-
versy. In its simplest form, discovery is the disclosure by one party
of facts, deeds, documents or other things which are in his exclusive
possession, to his adversary who must seek the discovery so as to
defend or prosecute adequately a pending cause of action or one to
be brought in another court.'
At common law, no right of discovery was recognized in crim-
inal cases 2 and until the adoption of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure in 1946, it is doubtful whether the existing law permitted
discovery.3 Although a broad right of discovery is available in civil
cases, 4 no such latitude exists in criminal cases up to the present time
in this country.5 The distinction between civil and criminal actions
has a logical basis. For example, in a civil case each side may take
the deposition of the other, whereas in a criminal case the prosecution
has no power to take a deposition of the defendant. 6
Requisites for Discovery
In all criminal cases prosecuted in federal courts, pre-trial dis-
covery is governed by Rule 16 and Rule 17(c) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure. A motion for inspection made during the
trial is not governed by any of the Federal Rules of Criminal Pro-
I BLACK, LAW DIcrioNARY 587 (3d ed. 1953).
2 See Rex v. Holland, 4 T.R. 691, 100 Eng. Rep. 1248 (1792). See also
Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1949) ; 6 WIGMoRE, EVIDWCE§ 1859g (3d ed. 1940).
3 FED. R. CGlm. P. 16, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules. See also
United States v. Rosenfeld, 57 F.2d 74 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 556
(1932).
4 Rule 34 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part:
"Upon motion of any party... the court in which an action is pending may
• . . order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or
photographing . . . of any designated documents, papers, books, accounts,
letters, photographs, objects, or tangible things, not privileged, which constitute
or contain evidence relating to any of the matters within the scope of the
examination . . . and which are in his possession, custody or control. . ..
5 Ibid.
6 See United States v. Carter, 15 F.R.D. 367 (D.D.C. 1954).
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cedure or by statute. Rather it is dealt with by judicial decision.7
To determine whether a demand for inspection is proper, the
court must note whether the defendant asserts his demand for pro-
duction and inspection of documents in the government's possession
either by motion, a subpoena duces tecum, or by oral argument made
before or during the course of the trial. Under Rule 16, a motion
for discovery and inspection of documents may be made at any time
after the filing of an indictment or an information.8 Since Rule 16
requires that any motion filed thereunder must allege: that the docu-
ments are in possession of the government; that the documents were
obtained from and belonged to the defendant or were obtained from
others by seizure or process; that the documents are material to the
defendant; and that the request is reasonable, such motions are limited
in the documents which they may reach. 9
Through Rule 17(c) production of documents may be compelled
by subpoena.10 However, inspection of such documents can be had
only by a motion addressed to the discretion of the court." As pro-
duction of documents is distinguished from their inspection, so too the
use of the subpoena should be distinguished from the motion to in-
spect subpoenaed documents.12 Rule 17(c) provides that upon their
7 See Orfield, Discovery And Inspection In Federal Criminal Procedure,
59 W. VA. L. REv. 221, 239 (1957).
8 Rule 16 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides: "Upon
motion of a defendant at any time after the filing of the indictment or infor-
mation, the court may order the attorney for the government to permit the
defendant to inspect and copy or photograph designated books, papers, docu-
ments or tangible objects, obtained from or belonging to the defendant or ob-
tained from others by seizure or by process, upon a showing that the items
sought may be material to the preparation of his defense and that the request
i4 reasonable...." FEm. R. Calm. P. 16 (emphasis added).9 Interpreting Rule 16, the courts have held that the defendant is not
entitled to a copy of his own confession, Shores v. United States, 174 F.2d
838, 843 (8th Cir. 1949); that since statements of the defendant after his
arrest were obviously not material taken from or belonging to him, the defen-
dant is not entitled to them, United States v. Chandler, 7 F.R.D. 365, 366
(D. Mass. 1947), aff'd, 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336 U.S.
918 (1949) ; and that a request for a copy of a statement made to an assistant
United States Attorney must be denied because there was no showing of
materiality or reasonableness, United States v. Peltz, 18 F.R.D. 394 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).10 It should be noted that under Rule 17(c) a subpoena may issue from the
government to a defendant. FED. R. CRrm. P. 17(c). However, its only
purpose must be for production of evidence at the trial and not for pre-trial
discovery. United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248, 250 (D. Mass. 1953)
(dictum).
:1 See United States v. Schneiderman, 104 F. Supp. 405, 408 (S.D. Cal.
1952), where the court said: "It seems dear then that whether materials
subject to subpoena are to be produced and inspected prior to trial rests within
the discretion of the trial court."
12 See Bowman Dairy Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 214, 220 (1951)
(fails to distinguish between subpoenas and motions when it speaks of sub-
poenas for "production, inspection and use") ; Fryer v. United States, 207 F2d
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production the court may permit the documents to be inspected.13
Only through filing a motion to inspect the subpoenaed documents
may the defendant seek this exercise of judicial discretion.14 To pre-
vent the imposition of an unduly onerous burden on the government
by liberal use of subpoenas, the rule permits the court, on motion
promptly made, to quash or modify the subpoena if compliance would
be unreasonable or oppressive 15 or if the documents demanded would
not be admissible,' 6 relevant 1 7 or be readily obtainable by other
means.
18
After a government witness has taken the stand, the defendant
may have two distinct opportunities to demand production and in-
spection of documents in possession of the government. If, during
direct examination, a witness uses a document to refresh his recollec-
tion, the defendant may, without question, demand an opportunity to
inspect the document.' 9 Prior to the decision in Jencks v. United
States,20 the rule was that a defendant was not entitled to a document
in possession of the government for use in impeaching a government
witness on the basis of prior contradictory statements contained
therein, until he had laid a foundation for the impeachment. 2' To sup-
port a demand for a document, the defendant, in laying a foundation
134 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 885 (1953) (court appears to treat
issuance of subpoena as grant of right to inspect); United States v. Hiss,
9 F.R.D. 515, 516-17 (S.D.N.Y. 1949) (by quashing subpoena issued before
trial and vacating pre-trial motion to inspect the subpoenaed documents on the
ground that the documents could not be used in evidence until the witness was
called, the court appears to be equating the subpoena and the motion).
23 FE. R. Cums. P. 17(c).
14 See United States v. Schneiderman, supra note 10, at 407-08 (subpoenaed
documents produced in court before trial; motion for pre-trial inspection
denied); United States v. Iozia, 13 F.R.D. 335, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1952) (sub-
poenaed documents produced in court before trial; motion for pre-trial inspection
in discretion of court granted in part and denied in part). See also United
States v. Maryland and Va. Milk Producers Ass'n, 9 F.R.D. 509, 510 (D.D.C.
1949).
'
5 FED. R. Cium. P. 17(c).
'
6 United States v. Echeles, 222 F.2d 144, 152 (7th Cir. 1955); United
States v. Brown, 17 F.R.D. 286, 287-88 (N.D. Ill. 1955).
17United States v. Ward, 120 F. Supp. 57, 59 (S.D.N.Y. 1954); United
States v. Giglio, 16 F.R.D. 268, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 1954).
United States v. Cohen, 15 F.R.D. 269, 273 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
19 Montgomery v. United States, 203 F2d 887, 893-94 (5th Cir. 1953);
United States v. Rappy, 157 F.2d 964, 967-68 (2d Cir. 1946), cert. denied.
329 U.S. 806 (1947).
20353 U.S. 657 (1957).2
'See Gordon v. United States, 344 U.S. 414 (1953), where the Court
allows the inspection of certain documents. The Court said: "By proper
cross-examination, defense counsel laid a foundation for his demand by show-
ing that the documents were in existence, were in possession of the government,
were made by government's witness under examination, were contradictory of
his present testimony, and that the contradiction was as to relevant, important
and material matters which directly bore on the main issue being tried: the
participation of the accused in the crime." Id. at 418-19. See also United
States v. Kinzer, 98 F. Supp. 6, 9 (D.D.C. 1951).
1957]
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for impeachment, was required to show, by cross-examination of the
witness: that the documents were in existence; that they were in
possession of the government; that the documents were contradictory
to the witness' present testimony; that the contradiction pertained to
relevant, important and material matters bearing directly on the main
issue being tried; and that they tended to impeach.
In opposition to a demand to produce documents, the government
has certain recognized privileges and, in addition, the public interest
may also dictate against disclosure.2 2 It should be recognized, how-
ever, that such an argument does not have the strength and force in
criminal cases that it has in civil cases.23 If a defendant is able to
establish that the document demanded has definite evidentiary value
and is material to his defense, the courts will generally compel the
government to produce the document or suffer a dismissal of the
indictment.2 4
Jencks v. United States
The Jencks decision, pertaining to FBI files in criminal cases
prosecuted by the federal government, has been widely discussed
since it was handed down by the United States Supreme Court.25
The case embraced the following situation: Clinton E. Jencks, as
president of a local labor union, filed in 1950 a sworn affidavit, as
required by law, with the National Labor Relations Board stating
"... that he is not a member of the Communist Party or affiliated
with such party." Subsequently, he was indicted 20 for falsely swear-
ing in the affidavit that he was not a member of the Communist Party
or affiliated with such party. During the trial at which Harvey F.
Matusow and J. W. Ford, government witnesses, testified against
Jencks, defense counsel requested an opportunity to inspect the re-
ports the two witnesses submitted to the FBI. The government op-
posed the request, arguing that a preliminary foundation of incon-
sistency had not been laid between the contents of the reports and
the testimony of the witnesses. Both the trial courts and the Court
22 If, for example, the document identifies a confidential informant or if
the documents pertain to national defense and national security, disclosure will
not be compelled unless such disclosure is necessary to the defense. See Scher
v. United States, 95 F.2d 64 (6th Cir.), aff'd, 305 U.S. 251 (1929); United
States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629, 638 (2d Cir. 1950) (dictum); United States
v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,694, at 190-92 (C.C. Va. 1807) (dictum);
8 WIGm OE, EvIDENCE § 2374 (3d ed. 1940).23 See United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
24 See United States v. Beekman, 155 F.2d 580 (2d Cir. 1946); United
States v. Andolschek, 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
25 See, e.g., 103 CONG. REc. 14549 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1957); Brooklyn
Tablet, Aug. 17, 1957, p. 1, col. 6-8.
26 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1952) makes the willful filing of a false statement a
crime punishable by a fine of $10,000 or imprisonment for not more than five
years, or both.
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of Appeals denied all such motions to produce the statements on this
ground. The Supreme Court, reversing, ruled that the defense was
entitled, without laying a preliminary foundation of inconsistency, to
an order 27 directing the government to produce for inspection all re-
ports of the government witnesses, in its possession. This order ap-
plies to all written reports and those oral reports that the government
recorded. 28 They further ruled that the defense is entitled to inspect
the reports to decide whether to use them in defense.
The practice of producing government documents to the trial judge for his
determination of relevancy and materiality, without hearing the accused, is
disapproved. . . . Only after inspection of reports by the accused, must the
trial judge determine admissibility-e.g., evidentiary questions of inconsistency,
materiality and relevancy-of the contents and the method to be employed for
the elimination of parts immaterial or irrelevant.2 9
Concurring in the result of the majority, but with different reasoning,
were Justices Burton and Harlan. They rejected the rule which
would enable the defendant to judge the evidentiary value of state-
ments before the trial judge has passed upon their admissibility. To
them, ". . in matters relating to the production of evidence or the
scope of cross-examination, a large discretion must be allowed the
trial judge." 30 They pointed out that the Court went beyond the
request of the petitioner in the case, the request that reports be pro-
duced for examination by the trial court.3 1
Jencks Rule as Applied by the Courts
Shortly after the lencks decision was handed down, a number of
conflicting decisions, even within judicial districts, were rendered by
the courts, each purporting to interpret or follow lencks.3 2 Perhaps
27 "We hold that the petitioner was not required to lay a preliminary foun-
dation of inconsistency, because a sufficient foundation was established by the
testimony of Matusow and Ford that their reports were of the events and
activities related in their testimony." Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657,
666 (1957).
28 "We now hold that the petitioner was entitled to an order directing the
government to produce for inspection all reports of Matusow and Ford in
its possession, written and, when orally made, as recorded by the FBI, touch-
ing the events and activities as to which they testified at the trial." Id. at 668.
29 Id. at 669. They also said: "We hold, further, that the petitioner is
entitled to inspect the reports to decide whether to use them in his defense...
[T]he defense must initially be entitled to see them to determine what use
may be made of them. Justice requires no less." Id. at 668-69 (emphasis
added).
soId. at 669.
31 Petitioner in his brief had asked only "... that the reports be produced
to the trial judge so that he could examine them and determine whether they
had evidentiary value for impeachment purposes." Id. at 673 n.1 (emphasis
added).
32 103 CONG. REc. 14551-52 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1957). In the Southern
District of Texas a District Judge ruled that on the basis of the Tencks de-
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the most widely publicized case illustrating the disturbing conflict
of judicial opinion in applying Jencks to pre-trial disclosure occurred
in a criminal fraud case arising in Kentucky. Citing Jencks as au-
thority, the court granted the defense motion for pre-trial examination
of all documents, exhibits and statements intended for trial use. The
Department of Justice instructed the United States Attorney not to
produce them and furnished him with copies of opinions from other
courts reasoning against such pre-trial submissions under J-encks.
When an FBI agent appeared in court he cited Departmental Order
3229 in stating that he was without authority to make statements
available. The court held the FBI agent in civil contempt and im-
posed a fine of $1,000. In his ruling, the judge stated:
I cannot understand why the United States would object to a full compliance
with the order. It seems clear that the language of Jencks decision entirely
dissipates any thought that the court must wait until the trial of the case before
requiring the production of documents. There could be no reason for such
a rule. 33
Many of the decisions interpreting Jencks were just short of
revolutionary. Orders for the government to furnish the deferlse with
a list of witnesses in advance of trial; orders for the production of
entire investigative files and grand jury proceedings; and even orders
for the release of convicted kidnappers when the government objected
to producing its entire FBI file in the case, were given.34 These in-
terpretations demonstrated the need for a regular procedure to handle
demands for, and production of, statements and reports of witnesses
in the government file in order to prevent serious damage to federal
law enforcement.3 5
The Senate Judiciary Committee, particularly the subcommittee,
addressed itself to the problem and, on June 24, 1957, introduced bill
No. S. 2377.36 The legislation as originally introduced was prepared
by the Department of Justice and introduced by Senator O'Mahoney,
chairman of the Subcommittee on Improvements in the Federal Crim-
cision, the defendant was entitled to relevant statements and reports after
the witness had testified. United States v. Parr, id. at 14552. In the same
circuit, another District Judge ordered the United States Attorney to turn
over to the defense its entire FBI investigative file, prior to trial. To add
insult to injury, the attorney for the defense asked the United States Attorney
to mail him the file. United States v. Young, id. at 14552.
33 See S. REP,. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) in 14 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. Nmvs at 3220 (Sept. 20, 1957).
34 See 103 CONG. RFc. 14551-54 (daily ed. Aug. 26, 1957).
35 In a letter to Rep. Joseph W. Martin, Jr., of Massachusetts, Republican
leader of the House, J. Edgar Hoover wrote concerning the proposed legis.
"lation: "Its enactment is vital to the future ability of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to carry out its internal security and law enforcement respon-
sibilities." Brooklyn Tablet, Aug. 17, 1957, p. 17, col. 3.
36 See 103 CONG. REc. 9095-96 (daily ed. June 24, 1957).
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inal Code of the Committee of the Judiciary. 37 The Senate report
declares that
it is the specific intent of the bill to provide for the production only of written
statements previously made by a Government witness in the possession of the
United States which are signed by him or otherwise adopted or approved by
him, and any transcriptions or recordings of oral statements made by the wit-
ness to a Federal law officer, relating to the matter as to which the witness
has testified.53
The Committee rejected".. any interpretation of the Jencks decision
which would provide for the production of entire investigative files,
grand jury testimony, or similar materials." 39
The bill, approved and enacted into law on September 2, 1957,40
adopts the principle in the majority opinion of the Jencks decision
insofar as it requires the government to produce the written or re-
corded statements or reports of a witness without first having to lay
a foundation for impeachment. However, the statute explicitly
provides that
... no statement or report ... which was made by a Government witness or
prospective Government witness . .. shall be the subject of subpoena, dis-
covery, or inspection until said witness has testified on direct examination in
the trial of the case... 41
The statute, however, substantially adopts the procedure set forth in
the Jencks concurring opinion for implementing the principle as
adopted. 42  Section (c) provides:
If the United States claims that any statements ordered to be produced
under this section contains matter which does not relate to the subject matter
of the testimony of the witness, the court shall order the United States to
deliver such statement for the inspection of the court in camera. Upon such
delivery the court shall excise the portions of such statements which do not
relate to the subject matter of the testimony of the witness.43
If the defendant objects to the excision and is finally adjudged
guilty by the trial court, the entire text of the statement ". . . shall be
made available to the appellate court for the purpose of determining
the correctness of the ruling . . ." 44 in the event an appeal is taken.
37 S. REP. No. 981, 85th Cong., 1st Sess. (1957) in 14 U.S. CODE: CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws at 3215 (Sept. 20, 1957).
38 Id. at 3216.
39 Ibid.
40 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. 1957).
4xIbid. (emphasis added).
42 See Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957), where Mr. Justice
Burton said: "Whether a new trial is required should depend on the contents
of the requested reports. If the reports contain matexial that the trial court
finds has evidentiary value to petitioner, a new trial should be granted in order
that the petitioner may use it." Id. at 678 (concurring opinion).
43 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (Supp. 1957) (emphasis added).
44 Ibid.
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This provision minimizes the dangers inherent in defense counsel's
inability to see the entire statement, by subjecting the trial court's
excisions to appellate scrutiny.
It should be noted that the statute, in providing alternative
courses of action for the trial judge, does not adopt the strict ruling
of the majority opinion which requires dismissal of the criminal action
when the government elects not to produce a statement or report for
the inspection and use of the defendant.45 The course of action to be
pursued by the trial judge must depend upon the importance of the
testimony, the documents to be produced, and other facts and
circumstances.
Conclusion
There has developed, in recent years, a strong tendency to allow
liberal discovery in civil actions. However, this tendency should be
strongly controlled in criminal prosecutions. The highest court of
the State of New Jersey recently stated:
In criminal proceedings long experience has taught the courts that often dis-
covery will lead not to honest fact-finding, but on the contrary to perjury and
the suppression of evidence.4 6
It is submitted that it is far easier for a perjured witness or a
fabricated defense to instill only a reasonable doubt in the minds of a
jury, than it is to balance the weight of a civil plaintiff's evidence.
A
DISMISSAL OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES UNDER FEDERAL
AND NEW YORK SECURITY RISK LAWS
Introduction
There is general agreement that no disloyal citizen should be
employed in government. How to achieve this end, however, is one
of the great controversies of our time. Some have criticized the cur-
rent loyalty and security programs as infringements on civil liberties;
others claim that by them, our system of government is being under-
45 "We hold that the criminal action must be dismissed when the Govern-
ment, on the ground of privilege, elects not to comply with an order to produce,
for the accused's inspection and for admission in evidence, relevant statements
or reports in the possession of government witnesses touching the subject
matter of their testimony at the trial." Jencks v. United States, supra note 41,
at 672.
46 State v. Tune, 13 N.J. 203, 98 A.2d 881, 884 (1953).
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